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Using Strategic Environmental Assessments
to Guide Oil and Gas Exploration Decisions:
Applying Lessons Learned from Atlantic Canada
to the Beaufort Sea
Meinhard Doelle, Nigel Bankes and Louie Porta
The Macondo oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has spurred
renewed global interest in the regulation of offshore oil
and gas exploration, particularly in deepwater areas.
At the same time, many jurisdictions are experimenting with strategic environmental assessment (SEA)
processes to fill gaps in more traditional project-based
decision-making processes. This article explores the
potential of SEA to enhance decision making for exploration in deepwater environments. It does so by examining the experience with SEAs on the east coast of
Canada, and applying the lessons learned to the Beaufort Sea. By looking at the issue in two very different
environments, we can draw lessons that may also
apply to deepwater exploration elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century has seen renewed interest in
developing Arctic oil and gas reserves.1 The marine
waters of the Arctic Ocean prospectively hold 13%, 30%
and 20% of undiscovered global oil, natural gas and gas
liquid reserves.2 The development of Arctic marine
petroleum resources has become a priority for the five
coastal Arctic nations: Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Russia and the United States. Simultaneously, multinational hydrocarbon companies view the Arctic as the
last major oil and gas frontier. Sustainable Arctic oil
and gas exploration and development requires a preemptive, strategic decision-making process that can
effectively guide economic considerations in step with
environmental risks.
Historically, hydrocarbon development efforts focused
on land or shallow water hydrocarbon potential. Since
2008, the industry has shifted its attention to the deepwater areas of the Beaufort Sea – a region that to date
1
Northern Canada is estimated to contain a third of Canada’s remaining potential for conventional oil and natural gas. See <http://
www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100037301>.
2
D.W. Houseknecht, K.J. Bird and C.P. Garrity, Assessment of
Undiscovered Petroleum Resources of the Arctic Alaska Petroleum
Province (US Geological Survey, 2012).

has experienced limited exploration and no development.3 In the wake of the huge 2009 Macondo oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico, Canada’s National Energy Board
(NEB) initiated a public review of offshore drilling in
the Canadian Arctic to ensure the regulatory system
was prepared to handle the unique challenges.4 There
was no similar examination of the adequacy and appropriateness of Canada’s Arctic oil and gas rights issuance
process. In this article, we argue that a key weakness in
the current procedure is the failure of the government
to apply state of the art strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) as part of deciding where and when
to open new areas to potential oil and gas drilling
activities.
In the past two decades, SEAs have emerged as an
important complement to project-based environmental
assessments (EAs) and other planning tools. The interest in SEAs arises from an understanding of the limitation of project-based EA processes, which are not well
suited to dealing with a consideration of alternatives,
cumulative effects and broader policy issues. Furthermore, project-based EAs are undertaken at a time when
important decisions and commitments have already
been made. SEAs have been used internationally as part
of making decisions on opening new areas to potential
oil and gas drilling activities, and they have also been
used on the east coast of Canada to inform the first
phases of the oil and gas rights issuance process (industry nominations, more formal government calls for
nominations and calls for bids).5 SEAs attempt to
outline, integrate, refine and mitigate regional-scale
concerns related to ecologically sensitive areas, multisectoral ocean use and cumulative effects in advance of
project-based EAs. They also have the potential to consider the need, purpose and rationale of a proposed
3
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AAND),
Northern Oil And Gas Annual Report (AAND, 2011), at 9.
4
National Energy Board (NEB), The Past is Always Present: Review
of Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic (NEB, 2011), at 3.
5
See, e.g., C. Fidler and B. Noble, ‘Advancing Strategic Environmental Assessment in the Offshore Oil and Gas Sector: Lessons from
Norway, Canada and the United Kingdom’, 34 Environmental Impact
Assessment Review (2012), 12.
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development and alternatives to offshore oil and gas
development before specific projects are proposed. In
other words, SEAs are well suited to asking what societal needs are being met with this type of development,
and whether there are better ways to meet those needs.
This is particularly significant in Canada since neither
calls for nominations nor the call for bids will trigger an
EA under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(CEAA).6
Other jurisdictions also routinely conduct SEAs before
opening up new areas for oil and gas activities,7 including other Arctic States (such as the United States,
Norway and Denmark/Greenland) with offshore hydrocarbon potential. In addition, the Arctic Council’s Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines support the use of SEAs as
part of best practice in the development of oil and gas
resources.8 More generally, European countries have
considerable experience with the use of SEA as a
decision-making tool to address some of the shortcomings of more traditional project-based EA processes.
Many European countries, including Arctic States, are
party to the Kiev Protocol on Strategic Environmental
Assessment.9 Article 4 of the Protocol requires parties
to conduct an SEA for ‘plans and programmes which
are prepared for . . . [inter alia the] energy industry . . .
and which set the framework for future development
consent’ for certain listed projects, including offshore
hydrocarbon production projects.10
SEAs have been used as a key ingredient of the oil and
gas rights issuance process for exploration in the waters
of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland-Labrador since
6

SC 1992, c. 37. The CEAA has been replaced by the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act 2012, SC 2012, c. 19, but the new Act
does not change this fundamental point.
7
J. Dagg, et al., Comparing Deepwater Drilling Regulatory Regimes
of the Canadian Arctic, the US, the UK, Greenland and Norway
(Pembina Institute, 2011).
8
Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (2009), found
at:
<http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/
category/62-pame>. The Arctic Council recommends the use of SEA
‘on a regional basis to determine the potential environmental impacts
of human activity including opening areas for oil and gas’. Ibid., at 17.
The Guidelines articulate three key reasons for conducting SEAs.
First, since an SEA occurs early in the process it can and should
integrate environmental concerns into the first stages of decision
making. Second, an SEA has, by definition, a wide scope and thus
sets the stage for the more specific environmental impact assessments that will follow as hydrocarbon development unfolds. Third,
individual strategic environmental assessments form part of an
ongoing strategic environmental assessment process, insofar as they
continuously update baseline scientific knowledge of the region under
investigation. Ibid.
9
UNECE Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Kiev, 21 May 2003; in force 11 July 2010) (‘Kiev Protocol’). As of September 2012 there were 25 parties to the Kiev
Protocol. The Arctic States that are party are: Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden. Denmark’s ratification, however, does not
extend to the Faroe Islands and Greenland.
10
Ibid., Articles 4.1 and 4.2, and Annex I, item 15.
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2002. Since then, the Canada-Newfoundland and
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) and
the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board
(C-NSOPB) have conducted eight SEAs. As this article
discusses, the two offshore boards used SEAs to achieve
five objectives:
(1) to inform decisions related to the issuance of
exploration licenses in the study area;
(2) to understand the interaction between expected
exploration activities and the receiving environment, including its current use;
(3) to minimize environmental and safety disasters;
(4) to identify sensitive environmental areas which
require special mitigation protocols; and
(5) to identify areas where development should be
avoided.11
There are some important legal and jurisdictional differences between Canada’s Arctic and east coast which
need to be taken into account in developing and applying SEAs, but none of these differences undermine the
fundamental point that a state of the art SEA process
which meets international standards is a key part of
the responsible development of offshore oil and gas
resources. Some of these key jurisdictional differences
include the unique constitutional status of the three
northern territories under Canadian law (and therefore
the role played by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development), the important role played
by land claim agreements and related institutions in
northern Canada.
The article proceeds as follows. It first describes how
the federal oil and gas leasing regimes operate in three
different parts of Canada: Nunavut, the Northwest Territories and associated offshore areas;12 the areas offshore of Newfoundland and Labrador; and the areas
offshore of Nova Scotia. This section shows that while
the relevant legislation is silent with respect to SEAs,
the example of the east coast boards demonstrates that
11
There are, of course, some differences between the SEA processes of the two boards. Most notably, the Nova Scotia Board does
not deal with development, nor does it explicitly consider whether an
area should be avoided for development. Its focus is exclusively on
exploration. The Newfoundland Board does give some consideration
to development, but it is not clear how this information affects decisions by the board.
12
Following devolution of oil and gas rights and legislative responsibility to Yukon in November 1998, Yukon now has its own oil and gas
regime (the Yukon Oil and Gas Act, RSY 2002, c. 162). Note that the
Yukon government recently decided not to proceed with a disposition
following expressions of interest by industry in blocks of land in the
Whitehorse Trough. The government noted that it had been surprised
by these expressions of interest and concluded that concerns and
questions were raised that required further study thus, somewhat
ironically, confirming the importance of making decisions to open a
new area only after a strategic assessment that involves input from
the public. See Yukon Government News Release, ‘Government of
Yukon Announces Decision on Oil and Gas Postings’ (12 April 2012),
found at: <http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/2011/files/12-064.pdf>.
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it is possible to integrate SEA procedures within the
current disposition rules. The following sections
examine the form of SEA that should be put in place for
the Canadian Beaufort Sea. To that end, the article
draws on SEA literature to provide a statement of principles of good practice. The article next describes the
SEA practice of the east coast boards and offers some
brief comparative commentary on relevant SEA experiences in the United Kingdom and Norway. The ensuing
section critiques the practice to date in light of the SEA
principles. The final part of the article draws on this
experience and analysis to outline how an effective SEA
process for the Canadian Beaufort Sea might be integrated into the current oil and gas exploration and
leasing regime as well as the two land claim agreements
which touch on the Beaufort Sea: the Inuvialuit Final
Agreement and the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement.
This section will also illustrate how an SEA could build
on the proposed oil and gas research initiative, the
Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment.

OIL AND GAS DISPOSITION
SCHEMES FOR FEDERAL LANDS
IN CANADA: THE CANADA
PETROLEUM RESOURCES ACT
AND OFFSHORE ACCORDS
The three oil and gas leasing regimes that cover the
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, the Arctic offshore,
and the marine areas offshore of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador all have the same starting
point, which is the disposition scheme described in the
Canada Petroleum Resources Act (CPRA).13 On the east
coast, the respective Accords14 between Canada and the
two provincial governments15 resulted in additional
provisions being grafted onto the basic scheme
described by the CPRA, largely to provide a role for
joint federal-provincial decision making through
the two offshore boards: the C-NSOPB16 and the
C-NLOPB.17 The Accords were implemented by mirror
legislation adopted by the Canadian parliament and the
13

RSC 1985, c. 36 (2nd Supp) (‘CPRA’).
The Atlantic Accord: Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador on Offshore Oil and Gas Resources Management and Revenue
Sharing, 11 February 1985, found at: <http://www.servicenl.gov.nl.ca/
printer/publications/aa_mou.pdf>; Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Resources Accord (1986), found at: <http://gov.ns.ca/
energy/resources/RA/offshore/1986-Canada-NS-OffshorePetroleum-Resource-Accord.pdf>.
15
The Accords were negotiated to allow the provincial governments a
co-management role with respect to the offshore areas adjacent to
their coasts, notwithstanding a series of Supreme Court decisions
that confirmed that these offshore areas were all beyond the
territory of the respective provinces and therefore subject to federal
jurisdiction.
16
<http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/>.
17
<http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/>.
14
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provincial legislature: the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act
(CNS)18 and the Canada- Newfoundland Atlantic
Accord Implementation Act (CNL).19 In what follows we
focus on the CPRA regime and then describe how the
east coast regimes track or differ from that of the CPRA.
The CPRA provides for three forms of tenure: an exploration licence, a significant discovery licence and a production licence. In the normal course of events, a
licensee progresses from the exploration licenses, via
the significant discovery licence, to the production
licence.20 Both the exploration licence and the significant discovery licence grant the licensee the exclusive
right to drill wells and to obtain a production licence.21
An exploration licence has a maximum duration of nine
years.22 A licensee can only hold onto the lands beyond
the term of the exploration licence if it makes a significant or commercial discovery23 during the term of the
exploration licence.24 A significant discovery licence has
an indefinite duration and is effectively a holding
licence which allows a licensee to hold on to a discovery
pending, for example, the development of appropriate
infrastructure (e.g., a pipeline).25 A production licence
grants the licensee the exclusive right to produce and
title to the oil and gas produced. This licence is issued
for a 25-year term, which is renewable if petroleum is
still being produced commercially at the end of the
initial term.26
This article focuses on the first step in this three-step
tenure scheme: the procedure for issuing an explora18

The federal legislation is SC 1988, c. 28 (‘CNS’); the provincial
legislation is SNS 1987, c. 3.
19
The federal legislation is SC 1987, c. 3 (‘CNL’); the provincial
legislation is RSNL 1990, c.2.
20
It is possible for the Crown to issue either a significant discovery
licence or a production licence as part of a call for bids if there is a
declaration of significant or commercial discovery in place for those
lands.
21
CPRA, n. 13 above, section 22 (on exploration licences) and
section 29 (on significant discovery licences).
22
Ibid., section 26.
23
There is a formal process for making a declaration of significant
discovery and a declaration of a commercial discovery. Both are
defined terms under the Act. Under the CPRA, these declarations are
made by the NEB. On the east coast, these decision are made by
the two offshore boards. There has been some litigation on the
declaration process. See, in particular, Petro-Canada v. CanadaNewfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (1995), 127 DLR (4th) 483
and Mobil Oil Canada Ltd v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (1994), 1 SCR 202. In addition, the two east coast boards
have offered guidance on these issues. See Joint Guidelines Regarding Applications for Significant or Commercial Discovery Declarations
and Amendments (May 2003), found at: <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/
pdfs/guidelines/sda_0503.pdf> (‘Joint Guidelines’).
24
Lands revert to the status of Crown reserve lands if they are not
subject to a declaration. CPRA, n. 13 above, sections 26.6 and 32.4.
25
The CPRA does not prescribe a term, but section 33 (ibid.) does
authorize the Minister to issue a drilling order to persons holding an
interest in the significant discovery.
26
Ibid., section 41.
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tion licence. This comprises a two-step procedure that
involves: a ‘call for nominations’ and a ‘call for bids’.27
The CPRA addresses the subject of calls for bids, but it
does not expressly refer to calls for nominations.28 The
same is true of the two east coast statutes, although
C-NSOPB has issued a set of detailed guidelines on the
issuance of exploration licences.
A ‘call for nominations’ is a procedure by which the
government assesses whether industry has any interest
in bidding on particular lands. It is in effect a call upon
industry to nominate particular lands that a company
might wish to see listed in a call for bids. Calls for
nominations remind industry to be aware of relevant
land claim agreements and also draw attention to the
species listed in the Species at Risk Act,29 as well as any
relevant land use plans with which developers may have
to conform. Calls for nominations may be geographically
targeted. Thus, governments may only ask for nominations in particular areas (or may exclude other areas).
A ‘call for bids’ is a formal document issued by the
Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development in which it calls upon industry to bid on particular blocks of land. The Act requires the Minister to
use a single bidding variable in selecting the successful
bid.30 This is typically a work bid (i.e., the amount of
work such as seismic or wells to which the company is
prepared to commit). There is no pre-qualification of
applicants.
The crucial point for present purposes is that the call for
nominations and the call for bids start a process which, if
carried through to completion, will see a developer
acquire an exploration licence and perhaps (successively
or not) a significant discovery licence or a production
licence. Neither the call for nominations nor the call for
bids triggers an environmental assessment under the
terms of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
because there is no project activity at this stage in the
process.31 Similarly, the CPRA and the east coast statutes
are completely silent on the need for an SEA.
Not all oil and gas exploration activities require
an exclusive tenure under the CPRA or the east coast
statutes. In particular, while a party requires an exploration licence, a significant discovery licence or a pro27

Note that the Nova Scotia Board does not have a formal call for
nominations; operators may nominate lands at any time, but nominations are reviewed by the board on a certain date each year.
28
But see CPRA, n. 13 above, section 14.2, which provides that: ‘Any
request received by the Minister to make a call for bids in relation to
particular frontier lands shall be considered by the Minister in selecting the frontier lands to be specified in a call for bids.’
29
SC 2002, c. 29.
30
CPRA, n. 13 above, section14.3(g).
31
See N. Bankes and P. Rowbotham, ‘The Oil and Gas Industry:
Some Current Problems in Environmental Law’, in: G. Thompson
et al. (eds.), Environmental Law and Business in Canada (Canada
Law Book/Aurora, 1993), 543.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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duction licence in order to drill a well, they do not
require one of these forms of licence in order to conduct
seismic exploration. Instead, such an activity requires
an authorization under the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act (COGOA).32 Since a seismic operation – unlike
the mere issuance of a licence – is a physical activity, a
request for an authorization will trigger an environmental assessment under the CEAA.
Seismic programmes vary in intensity and purpose.
Some seismic activity is conducted by the Geological
Survey of Canada and similar science-based institutions to obtain a better understanding of regional
geology and structure. Other seismic activity, so-called
‘speculative’ or ‘spec’ seismic activity, is conducted (as
the name implies), by companies who run seismic
surveys in anticipation of calls for bids or nominations
in order to sell the results to oil and gas exploration
companies. And finally, the successful bidder on an
exploration block will likely both commit to (under the
terms of the exploration licence) and want to (i.e., for
reasons of self-interest) run additional seismic to determine priority drilling locations for any wells it plans or
is required to drill.
The legislation is completely silent with respect to consultation with aboriginal peoples, although all three
statutes contain an aboriginal rights savings clause or
non-derogation clause.33 However, consultation obligations may be imposed by relevant land claim agreements34 or by the Canadian Constitution as interpreted
by the relevant case-law.35
There are several key differences between the CPRA
and the east coast statutes. First, the latter provide for
the joint or co-management of offshore lands.36 There is
no co-management of lands covered by the CPRA
within Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. Instead,
the operating assumption, at least in relation to land
areas, is that federal oil and gas management will, at

32

RCS 1985, c. O-5.
CPRA, n. 13 above, section 3; CNS, n. 18 above, section 50; CNL,
n. 19 above, section 48.
34
For example Article 27.1.2 of the 1993 Nunavut Land
Claims Agreement, found at: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/
1100100030601/1100100030602>, provides that: ‘Prior to the initial
exercise of rights in respect of exploration, development or production
of petroleum on Crown lands in the Nunavut Settlement Area, and in
order to prepare a benefits plan for the approval of the appropriate
regulatory authority, the proponent shall consult the [Designated Inuit
Organization], and Government shall consult the [Designated Inuit
Organization], in respect to those matters listed in Schedule 27-1.’
35
See, in particular, Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation
(2010), SCC 53 (‘Beckman’), which is the authority for the proposition
that the terms of a land claim agreement do not exhaust the Crown’s
duty to consult.
36
CNS, n. 18 above, Part I, Joint Management; CNL, n. 19 above,
Part I, Joint Management.
33
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some time in the future, be devolved to the territorial
governments.37
Second, in furtherance of the idea of joint management,
the two east coast statutes have established offshore
boards and recognize the concept of a ‘fundamental
decision’, which is an important decision to be made by
the board that prima facie requires the concurrence of
both the federal and provincial ministers (subject to
some exceptions).38 There is no equivalent to the boards
under the CPRA, although the National Energy Board
does have a role in assessing significant and commercial discoveries and is also responsible for administering much of the COGOA.
Third, in the case of the lands subject to the CPRA there
is a clear separation between the property and regulatory functions of government. Thus, the CPRA is very
much concerned with managing the Crown’s oil and gas
property interests while the regulation of oil and gas
activities falls under the COGOA. The east coast statutes
deal with both issues in the same piece of legislation.
Fourth, the east coast statutes, consistent with the two
Accords, provide for resource revenue sharing.39 There
are no similar arrangements under the CPRA, although
revenue sharing arrangements may be put in place as
part of the devolution arrangements40 and may also be
prescribed by the terms of land claim agreements.41
Fifth, there are also differences in practice between the
rights issuance processes of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development and those of the
two offshore aforementioned boards. Some of these differences are quite significant. For example, east coast
boards have been much more active in issuing guidelines to industry than Northern Oil and Gas Canada or
the National Energy Board.42 Moreover, the CPRA
covers a much broader variety of lands than the East
Coast statutes. All wells on the east coast that fall under
the jurisdiction of the boards are offshore wells. By
contrast, the CPRA covers both land and marine areas
and thus some of the activities carried out under the
CPRA would look very similar to conventional oil and
gas operations in Northern Alberta or British Columbia.
37

The model here is Yukon (see n. 12 above). Yukon also obtained
jurisdiction over the so-called ‘adjoining area’: the immediate inshore
area close to the Yukon coast.
38
CNS, n. 18 above, section 2; and CNL, n. 19 above, section 2.
39
CNL, n. 19 above, Part IV.
40
For Yukon see, Yukon Government News Release, ‘Yukon Welcomes PM’s Commitment to Improve Resource Revenue Sharing
Agreement’ (29 August 2011), found at: <http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/
2011/files/11-132.pdf>.
41
See, e.g., the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, n. 34 above,
Article 25.
42
Examples include the Joint Guidelines, n. 23 above and the
C-NSOPB, Guidelines on the Issuance of Exploration Licences
(January 2012), found at: <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/sites/default/
files/pdfs/final_guidelines_on_issuance_of_el_.pdf>.
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Furthermore, the east coast boards have, as will be discussed below, followed the practice of conducting SEAs
before calling for bids in a new area. There is no similar
consistent practice for lands subject to the CPRA,
although in some cases the Government of Canada has
experimented with integrated planning processes such
as the Beaufort Sea Strategic Regional Plan of Action 43
and the Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment.

SEA PRINCIPLES OF GOOD
PRACTICE
SEAs are not new. They have been carried out in many
jurisdictions – most notably the European Union and
by parties to the Kiev Protocol.44 In Canada, there have
been federal cabinet directives on SEAs in place for over
two decades. Some provinces also allow for EAs of policies, plans and programmes. Furthermore, several
SEAs have been carried out in Canada without any
specific legal authorization or requirement.45
The term ‘SEA’ means different things to different
people, and is practiced very differently across jurisdictions. Some definitions, such as the one in the current
federal cabinet directive, use the term primarily in the
context of major decisions by the executive branch of
government. Others view SEA as an overriding concept
that covers all EAs that go beyond individual projects.46
Perhaps the most familiar form of SEA is the assessment of a proposed government policy, plan or programme. This form of SEA is a reactive process that
seeks to identify potential environmental concerns
associated with proposed government action before
43
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, ‘Announcement of an Integrated
Oceans Management Plan for the Beaufort Sea’ (27 August 2010),
found at: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/back-fiche/2010/hqac43a-eng.htm>.
44
Kiev Protocol, n. 9 above; see also United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE), Resource Manual to Support
Application of the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment
(United Nations, 2012).
45
Because most jurisdictions do not require SEAs to be carried out,
when they are identified as useful in a particular context SEAs are
often designed on an ad hoc basis. For examples, see B.F. Noble and
J. Bronson, Models of Strategic Environmental Assessment in
Canada (Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2007); H.
Benevides et al., Law and Policy Options for Strategic Environmental
Assessment in Canada (October 2009), found at: <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1660403>; and R. Gibson
et al., ‘Strengthening Strategic Environmental Assessment in
Canada: An Evaluation of Three Basic Options’, 20:3 Journal of
Environmental Law and Practice (2010), 175.
46
For an assessment of the federal cabinet directive on SEA, see S.
Hazel and H. Benevides, ‘Federal Strategic Environmental Assessment: Toward a Legal Framework’, 7:3 Journal of Environmental Law
and Practice (1997), 349. See also B.F. Noble and J. Harriman Gunn,
‘Strategic Impact Assessment’, in: K.S. Hanna (ed.), Environmental
Impact Assessment: Practice and Participation (Oxford University
Press, 2005), 93.
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government approval is granted. However, SEAs can
take many other forms. Some focus on specific industry
sectors (e.g., offshore wind or tidal power production)
or a particular type of activity (e.g., energy, shale gas
exploration and hydraulic fracturing, aquaculture and
fishing). Others focus on a range of activities in a given
region. SEAs can also be used to develop a new policy,
plan or programme, or to assess existing policies.
Dalal-Clayton and Sadler consider a number of definitions of SEA in their 2005 book on international experience with SEAs.47 They note that early definitions of
SEA were closely linked to project assessments. More
recent definitions have tended to take a broader perspective by including environmental, economic and
social considerations. Furthermore, SEA is increasingly
seen as a tool for the proactive development of policies,
plans and programmes, rather than a reactive review.48
SEAs can be used in a variety of contexts, with different
needs and outcomes. Nevertheless, there appears to be
general agreement on the basic steps and principles
that should guide SEA processes. The procedural steps
proposed for SEAs tend to be similar to project EAs and
include the following: process selection or design; continuous public engagement; broad scoping; information gathering; review and analysis; documentation of
results; decision making; and follow-up.
Dalal-Clayton and Sadler offer a mix of general and
SEA-specific principles to guide the development of
SEAs.49 Noble and Harriman Gunn similarly draw on
the EA literature when concluding that SEA should:
focus on basic objectives and how to achieve them;
identify desired future outcomes and consider fully
alternative ways of achieving these outcomes; focus on
objectives; be proactive; be integrated; take a broad
approach; and be tiered.50 These are all principles
utilized in the literature on project-specific EAs.51
The following nine principles of good SEA practice are
proposed based on our review of SEA literature. Their
relevance in the offshore oil and gas exploration context
is then explored in the following section.
1. The SEA should be applied early and proactively
SEAs should be triggered before important policy and
project decisions are made, and no such decisions
should be made during the course of an SEA. There
should be clear rules as to when an SEA should be
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applied. There should be a clear statement of the
purpose of an SEA, including the decisions it is
intended to inform.
2. The SEA should be integrated at a substantive
level by incorporating biophysical (or ‘ecological’),
social and economic aspects
The SEA process should pay particular attention to
issues that have been difficult to deal with at the project
level, such as broader policy considerations, cumulative
effects, alternative means of achieving societal objectives and intergenerational considerations.
3. The SEA should take into account its place within
the other ‘tiers’ or levels of assessment
A policy decision on whether, when and under what
conditions to approve a certain type of activity in a
given study area would be expected to directly influence
future decisions in relation to particular project activities. Assessments of lower tier initiatives may influence
improvements in a higher tier. For instance, a previous
project-based EA on exploratory seismic activity may
provide useful information for an SEA on exploratory
drilling. An SEA on exploratory drilling may in turn
inform integrated management planning. Improved
assessments at all levels, as well as the practical benefit
that the overall assessment process is ‘streamlined’, are
among the benefits of ‘tiering’. The process or terms of
reference should establish a clear link between the SEA
outcomes and future higher and lower tier decisions.
4. The process should be guided by a legislative, regulatory or policy context
The legal context should confirm the need for consistency in legislation and regulations while providing
opportunities for improvement through ongoing
strengthening and clarification of the guidance. It
should establish the standard of assessment that must
be met in legislation. It should include clear delineation
of assessment roles and responsibilities in legislation,
with mechanisms to ensure credible independence
of assessment review, impartial administration and
adequate time and resources in legislation, regulations
and guidance as appropriate. By including these
elements, the legal context improves transparency,
opportunity and provides incentives to participate.
5. The process should be sufficiently flexible to fit
the particular circumstances of individual SEAs and be
carried out in an effective, efficient and fair manner
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B. Dalal-Clayton and B. Sadler, Strategic Environmental Assessment (Earthscan, 2005).
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See B.F. Noble and J. Harriman Gunn, n. 46 above.
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See M. Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A
Guide and Critique (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008), at 29.
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The process should be adjustable to fit the needs of a
particular SEA. The process design should consider the
overall context, including the subject matter of the SEA,
the scope, the decisions to be informed, the existing
decision-making context; and should identify who is in
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charge of the process. The process needs to have the
combination of flexibility and guidance necessary to
identify the appropriate scope of the SEA in light of the
decision that is to be informed. In turn, the party in
charge of the process must be carefully selected to be
impartial in light of the purpose and scope of the SEA
and the decisions to be informed.
6. The process should be transparent and include
opportunities for active public involvement throughout
Transparency is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for public engagement. SEAs require enhanced efforts
to encourage public participation. SEAs are only as
useful as they are successful in engaging those with a
stake in the outcome. The success of public engagement
therefore ultimately has to be measured in terms of the
result, and not just the effort to engage. Given their
longer term impact on decision making compared to
project-specific EAs, there needs to be a clear statement
as to how (and for how long) the SEA will inform future
decisions.
7. The SEA process should include effective incentives
to ensure that it is adhered to; that government, industry and public participants are motivated to learn
from the results of the process; and that decision
makers allow the results to inform future decisions
One of the lessons from project-specific EA is that it is
possible to mandate government decision makers to
follow an EA process, but it is difficult to force an
unmotivated, unwilling decision maker to implement
the process so as to maximize its influence on future
decisions and to make better decisions based on the
results of the process. This means that an SEA should
be designed to motivate decision makers to learn
from the process and to use the results to make better
decisions.
8. The SEA should be followed up in terms of actual
performance as well as actual effects
The SEA should require that actual performance be
compared with predictions, and that appropriate steps
are taken in response to the results of the follow up in
terms of improving: future decision making under the
particular SEA; the development of future SEAs and
resulting policy decisions; and the SEA process itself.
9. There must be political commitment to put in place
and implement a SEA regime and to use its results
Much of the momentum for implementing an effective
SEA process will only be realized when decision makers
are shown the benefits of such a regime. Key decision
makers should be participants in the design, establishment and implementation of the regime. By participating in the process, decision makers are more likely to
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see the benefits of following the recommendations, to
understand the subtleties of the conclusions reached,
and to appreciate the risk of deviating from the results
in terms of community and stakeholder support for
future government decisions.52
Some of the recommendations we make here have also
been articulated by others. For example, oil and gas
planning and research is well underway in the Canadian
Beaufort Sea, and in 2004 the Inuvialuit Game Council
initiated a joint federal-Inuvialuit-industry oil and gas
planning process, which culminated in the Beaufort Sea
Strategic Regional Plan of Action.53 The Council specifically recommended an SEA for the Canadian Beaufort
Sea to ensure a coordinated and integrated regional
approach towards EAs and cumulative effects associated with future offshore oil and gas developments.54
These nine principles of good SEA practice are all
drawn from our own update of a literature review that
was an integral part of the 2009 report on SEA commissioned by the CEAA.55 We add one additional principle here to the effect that any SEA process that is
adopted for offshore oil and gas issues in the Arctic
must reflect and be consistent with not only the terms
of relevant land claim agreements, but also with their
overall intent. We return to this point below.
In addition to the SEA literature, experience with
SEAs elsewhere also provides important context for
the design of a SEA for the Beaufort Sea. The next
section therefore considers the experience on the east
coast of Canada in some detail. This is followed by a
brief comparative assessment of SEA experience in the
offshore oil and gas context in Norway and the United
Kingdom.

SEA EXPERIENCE IN THE
OFFSHORE OIL AND
GAS CONTEXT
We have described the procedure by which companies
acquire offshore oil and gas rights through exploration
licences, noting that in some cases spec seismic may
occur before any exploration licence is issued. The decision to issue an exploration licence does not require
action under CEAA, although seismic activities and
drilling operations may require an EA. There is no
requirement under the offshore board legislation for an
SEA to inform exploration licence decisions. However,
52

See H. Benevides et al., n. 45 above.
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54
Ibid., at 2.
55
See H. Benevides et al., n. 45 above.
53

© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

109

MEINHARD DOELLE, NIGEL BANKES AND LOUIE PORTA

both the C-NSOPB and C-NLOPB began using SEAs
before opening up new areas under a call for bids in the
early 2000s, around the same time that stakeholders
debated whether exploration activities should be
subject to a screening or comprehensive study under
the CEAA.56
In 2005, the C-NSOPB sought policy advice from both
levels of government on the need to conduct SEAs prior
to a call for bids in an area. In response, the federal
Minister directed the board to undertake SEAs prior to
issuing licenses, unless the area in question had previously been studied in the context of a comprehensive
review. The province gave similar direction. The conclusion reached was that decisions on exploration are
covered by the federal cabinet directive on SEA.57 At the
project level, federal regulators settled on requiring
only a screening-level assessment for seismic projects
and exploration wells. The provincial governments
were reportedly supportive of this approach.58
The mandate of both boards is to regulate offshore oil
and gas development in a manner consistent with statutory obligations dealing with issues such as environmental protection and safety. This is important context.
Neither board has a mandate to consider broader policy
issues, such as how to resolve potentially competing
visions for the future of the offshore area under their
jurisdiction.

EXPLORATION SEAs:
NOVA SCOTIA59
The C-NSOPB first started carrying out SEAs to inform
decisions on exploration licenses in 2003 with an SEA
for an area immediatelysurrounding the Gully east of
Sable Island.60 In addition, it participated in a joint SEA
with the C-NLOPB for the Laurentian Sub-basin – an
area that was partly within the jurisdiction of each of
the two boards. Since these two early experiments with
56

The end result of this process was a change to the comprehensive
study regulation that exempted exploration activity from a comprehensive study under the CEAA. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, ‘Federal Minister Stéphane Dion Announces Changes
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58
Personal communication with Eric Theriault at C-NSOPB, February
2012.
59
For information on SEAs carried out by the C-NSOPB, see <http://
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Scotian Slope (June 2003), found at: <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/pdfs/
GullySEAJune03.pdf>.
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SEAs, the C-NSOPB has carried out two more exploration assessments: one for the Misaine Bank area east off
Cape Breton in 2005, and one for the Southwestern
Scotian Slope off mainland Nova Scotia in 2011.61
The focus of all exploration SEAs carried out by the
C-NSOPB has been on potential interactions between
expected exploration activity and the receiving environment, including its current uses. All four SEAs were
intended to inform decisions related to the issuance of
exploration licenses in the study area, rather than
broader policy issues such as whether oil and gas production is an appropriate activity in the study area or
whether the resources should be explored now or saved
for future use.62
The scope of all four SEAs is also similar. In line with
the objective of informing decisions about issuing
exploration licenses, SEAs focus on the biophysical
environment, existing human activities in the area,
activities expected to be involved in exploration, possible interactions with the biophysical environment and
existing activities, special risks and sensitivities identified, and special mitigation needs or areas to be
avoided.
The process has varied somewhat, but the basic elements have been the same. First, C-NSOPB chooses the
area for the SEA based on potential interest in exploration activities and production potential of the area.
Typically, the trigger for the SEA appears to be a call for
bids in a given offshore area. Areas that have been previously studied in the context of a comprehensive study
or panel review under a project-specific EA have so far
been excluded from SEAs. Boundaries for the study
area generally coincide with parcels generated for the
bidding process. The main variant in the process has
been the time taken and the level of public engagement.
The first public step in the SEA process has been the
preparation of a draft scoping document by an outside
consultant who carries out the major components of the
SEA. C-NSOPB staff take responsibility for the process,
while outside consultants assume responsibility for

61
See CEF Consultants, Strategic Environmental Assessment of
the Misaine Bank Area (December 2005), found at: <http://www.
cnsopb.ns.ca/pdfs/MisaineSEAFinalRep.pdf> (‘Misaine Bank SEA’);
Hurley Environment, Strategic Environmental Assessment: Petroleum Exploration Activities on the Southwestern Scotian Slope
(November 2011), found at: <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/pdfs/
SWSS_SEA_Final_Report_November_17_2011.pdf> (‘Southwestern
Scotian Slope SEA’).
62
This narrow focus is in line with the role the C-NSOPB played in
these SEAs. The boards are not sufficiently impartial to be in charge
of an SEA that looks at the broader policy issues. A decision to
broaden the scope of the SEA would have to be matched with a
realignment of responsibilities to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the resulting SEA process.
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drafting and finalizing the major documents required
for the process – particularly the scoping document and
the SEA report.
The draft scoping document is prepared with input
from expert federal authorities. It is then made available for public comment, usually for about a month.
Key stakeholders with an established interest in offshore oil and gas issues, such as the fishing industries
active in a given area, are contacted directly. Once all
comments have been reviewed, a final scoping document is prepared and released. A similar process is used
for the SEA report. The consultant prepares a draft that
is released for public comment. The report is finalized
once the comments received have been reviewed.63
The release of the SEA report is the final step in the
process. There is no board or governmental response to
the report, even though it is prepared by an outside
consultant rather than by the board itself. This means
that there is no clear decision from the board or the two
levels of government at the conclusion of the SEA.
Rather, the results of the SEA process are available to
decision makers faced with whether and under what
conditions to grant exploration licenses in the area.64
Our assessment of the SEAs carried out by the
C-NSOPB leads to the following conclusions. First, the
SEAs have generally confirmed that our understanding
of the receiving environment is incomplete. Specific
gaps are identified, but no specific recommendations
are made on whether and how to fill these gaps, or
whether the gaps should be filled before making decisions about exploration licences, exploration projects
or production. Second, the SEAs have identified certain
ecosystems that are either considered to be particularly
valuable or sensitive to impacts from exploration activities. Examples include the area identified for the Gully
Marine Protected Area and the snow crab fishing
grounds in the Misaine Bank Area. Third, the SEAs
have identified specific mitigation measures to protect
species vulnerable to the effects of exploration activities. Examples include the impacts of noise on the
endangered blue whale and the leatherback turtle.
63
The most significant deviation from this process involved the
Misaine Bank SEA. In this case, C-NSOPB scheduled hearings in
Cape Breton to hear more directly from stakeholders concerned
about exploration activities. The Misaine Bank SEA, n. 61 above,
involved the most vocal opposition to exploration activities, both from
aboriginal groups and from the fishing industry, concerned about the
impact on the lucrative snow crab fishery in the area. The concerns
were reflected in the final report and serve as a caution to developers
and regulators, but no decision was made at the time of the SEA as
to whether the concerns warranted excluding this area from exploration activity.
64
The Southwestern Scotian Slope SEA, n. 61 above, includes a
disclaimer in which the C-NSOPB disclaims any responsibility for the
accuracy of the content. This is further evidence that the SEA process
is exclusively an information-gathering process. It does not currently
include a transparent decision-making component.
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Fourth, cumulative effects, alternatives, worst case scenarios and broader policy issues are sometimes referenced, but no detailed analysis is carried out. The
ability of exploration activity to co-exist with existing
uses, particularly fishing, is included. Fifth, the conclusion reached in all SEAs is that standard mitigation is
generally adequate to address any concerns about the
interaction of exploration activities with the receiving
environment including existing uses documented in the
area, but that special mitigation identified is required in
specified circumstances. Sixth, no firm decisions or recommendations are included in the SEA reports on
whether, where and under what circumstances to
permit exploration activity in the study area. The intent
is to leave flexibility for decision makers to make regulatory decisions in light of the information provided.
In 2009, the C-NSOPB commissioned the consulting
firm Griffiths Muecke to consider stakeholder consultation issues in the context of a possible regional environmental assessment for the Nova Scotia offshore
area. The resulting report was based on a detailed
review of the first three SEAs carried out, as well as
interviews with participants and stakeholders. The
Griffiths Muecke report included the following recommendations for SEAs related to offshore oil and gas
exploration in Nova Scotia: an improved process for
early identification of issues; a clear future-oriented
perspective; identification and application of environmental protection objectives; presentation of scenarios
or alternatives; a clear rationale for limiting the study to
exploration and excluding consideration of development; discussion of risk and risk management; a
process for risk communication; clarification of terms
used to describe relative impact; clarification of the
process for identifying cumulative effects; clarification
of how the precautionary principle is being applied; and
criteria for declaring restricted, special management or
‘no-go’ areas for exploration. In addition to these specific recommendations, the Griffiths Muecke report
also concluded that the SEAs could have added value if
they could be used: as a decision-making and planning
tool for the industry, government and C-NSOPB; as a
management tool for government and C-NSOPB; and
as a communication tool for C-NSOPB.65

EXPLORATION SEAs:
NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
The joint SEA with Nova Scotia covering the Laurentian
Sub-basin in 2003 was the C-NLOPB’s first exploration
SEA.66 As was the case in Nova Scotia, the C-NLOPB
65

A. Muecke and L. Griffiths, ‘Regional Environmental Assessment
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For information about SEAs carried out by the C-NLOPB, see
<http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/env_strategic.shtml>.

© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

111

MEINHARD DOELLE, NIGEL BANKES AND LOUIE PORTA

carried out a second SEA for the Orphan Basin on its
own around the same time as the joint assessment.
Since then, the C-NLOPB has been more active than its
counterpart in Nova Scotia, conducting SEAs on
Western Newfoundland and Labrador in 2005, the
Sydney Basin in 2006 and the Labrador Shelf in 2008.
In 2010, the C-NLOPB carried out its first update in the
form of a consolidated SEA for the southern Newfoundland offshore area.
The process followed in Newfoundland was initially
identical to the Nova Scotia one described above. Over
time, however, the C-NLOPB has adjusted it in a few
notable ways. Key among these changes is efforts to
improve public engagement and to broaden the scope of
its SEAs to include some consideration of future oil and
gas production scenarios.67
With respect to public engagement, the C-NLOPB has
started to utilize multi-stakeholder organizing committees to broaden input into the SEA process. Notably, the
2008 assessment of the Labrador Shelf68 involved considerable efforts through a range of mechanisms to
gather the views of those potentially affected by exploration and production. In particular, the Nunatsiavut
government (established under the terms of the Labrador Inuit land claim agreement) engaged its citizens
and fed the results into the SEA process. This allowed
the Nunatsiavut government to utilize means of
engagement that were culturally appropriate to its Inuit
population. The Labrador Shelf SEA took the longest
time – spanning close to a year.
With respect to scope, a number of SEAs carried out by
the C-NLOPB provide basic information about the environmental impacts of production, suggesting that they
may be taken into account when deciding whether to
issue exploration licenses. Notwithstanding the inclusion of this information, the cumulative effects analysis
does not include an assessment of the interaction
between the effects of exploration and those from
production.69 Most notably, the cumulative effects
assessment has not included the development and consideration of a range of future scenarios based on different levels of oil and gas activities or other human
activities in the study area.
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EXPLORATION SEAs: THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND NORWAY
SEAs have also been used in the offshore oil and gas
context in the United Kingdom and Norway.70 This
section discusses the experiences in each of these
regions. A detailed review of the processes utilized in
these two jurisdictions is not warranted here as they
have been studied elsewhere.71 It is worth considering,
however, how SEA processes in these two jurisdictions
compare to those in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland,
and to consider whether they offer any additional
lessons for the Beaufort Sea.
In the United Kingdom, SEAs to inform decisions
regarding the licensing of offshore oil and gas exploration have been carried out since 1999, although they
were not legally required until 2004. They have been
carried out for each of the eight offshore oil and gas
quadrants. Similar to the experience on the east coast
of Canada, the SEAs inform decisions at the exploration licensing stage, with project-specific EAs still
required at the development stage. The scope of the
SEA process, as well as its role in the decision-making
process, appears reasonably similar to the experience
on the east coast of Canada.72 The assessment of alternatives in the United Kingdom appears more
advanced than on the east coast, but neither jurisdiction appears to be examining future scenarios as part
of the SEA.
Norway appears to be conducting SEAs in a broader
sense than the processes in Canada or the United
Kingdom. Regional SEAs on offshore oil and gas
exploration have been carried out there since 1997.
More recently, since 2006, more integrated planning
and assessment processes have been implemented.
Most notable is the inclusion of a range of human
activities in the study area, including oil and gas activity, fisheries and shipping. The end result appears to
be an integrated management process that includes,
but is not limited to, the impacts of oil and gas exploration. Norway thereby appears to have implemented
the assessment process with the broadest scope,
including alternatives and future scenario-based
assessments.73
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One notable difference in the conclusions of recent C-NLOPB
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should be addressed and how findings may influence future planning
and decision making.
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For an overview of SEA in the offshore oil and gas context, see C.
Fidler and B. Noble, n. 5 above. See also A. Muecke and L. Griffiths,
n. 65 above. The province of Quebec is also applying SEAs in two
different oil and gas contexts: first with respect to possible oil and gas
exploration in the marine areas of Anticosti, Madeleine and Baie des
Chaleurs Basins; and second, in the context of shale gas and issues
associated with hydraulic fracturing.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
SEA PROCESS OF THE
OFFSHORE BOARDS
This section considers how the SEA processes on the
Canadian east coast measures up against the nine principles of good SEA practice outlined above, and offers
some thoughts on what this experience suggests for an
effective and efficient SEA process for the Canadian
Beaufort Sea. The first principle is that SEAs should be
carried out early and proactively, and that it should
operate under clear rules. The SEAs carried out by the
offshore boards on the east coast are completed before
any exploration projects are considered. They are initiated in conjunction with the call for bids process for the
study area. Hence, SEAs follow the call for nominations
process and the original decision to open an area for
bids for exploration licences. While the exploration
licence is issued after the SEA is completed, the linkage
between the two processes is not clear. This means that
even though no project decisions are made before the
SEA is completed, important policy decisions do
precede it. The information gathered in these SEAs contains relevant context for those earlier policy decisions.
Conducting SEAs before the call for nominations would
significantly enhance the efficacy of the overall
decision-making process. It would also alleviate some
of the time constraints under which some of them had
to be carried out. Clear rules on the role of the SEA in
future decision-making will also be critical to the
success of an SEA for the Beaufort Sea.
The second principle is that SEAs should fully integrate
ecological, social and economic issues relevant to offshore oil and gas exploration. There is limited evidence
that the SEAs carried out by the offshore boards have
been integrated substantively in this manner. There has
been some effort to incorporate social and economic
aspects related to current uses in the study areas,
particularly with respect to commercial fishing and
aboriginal practices. However, the SEAs fall particularly short in addressing broader policy issues, cumulative effects and alternative future development
scenarios. It is here that more effort to identify the
ecological, social and economic implications of choices
to be made should be explored, particularly to inform
the fundamental policy decision whether an area
should be opened up for exploration in the first place.
The experience with integrated management in Norway
may offer some lessons in this regard. The main challenge in the east coast context is that broadening the
scope of the SEA would make it necessary to place the
process in the hands of an independent third party as
the offshore boards may not be perceived as sufficiently
impartial, given their focus on the oil and gas industry.
Careful thought will therefore have to be given to the
appropriate combination of scope and responsible
party for the SEA process for the Beaufort Sea. A broad
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scope following the Norwegian approach with an independent panel responsible for the process would be the
most effective combination.
The third principle relates to the place of SEAs
among the various decision-making tiers and levels of
assessment. The place of the boards’ SEAs among existing information-gathering, public-engagement and
decision-making processes would benefit from further
clarity. There should be a clear link to early policy decisions, such as the call for nomination and the call for
bids. The relationship to the issuance of the exploration
licence, the approval of individual exploration activities, and the expectation of oil and gas production
should also be clearly identified. The final SEA reports
generally provide guidance to the boards and proponents on mitigation measures for exploration activities
and areas that may be particularly sensitive to the
impacts of exploration. In the process, the SEAs hint at,
but do not clearly identify, areas that should be avoided.
There is no formal decision at the conclusion of the SEA
process. This makes it much more difficult to track the
role their play in the overall decision making at other
tiers and levels of assessment. There has been some
effort to fill information gaps identified in the SEAs, but
there has been little indication of decision makers
applying a precautionary approach until the information gaps are filled. This is critically important when
dealing with the exploration for oil and gas resources.
The choice to explore in spite of critical information
gaps increases risk and uncertainty. Careful thought
will have to be given to the place of an SEA for the
Beaufort Sea in the overall decision-making process for
offshore oil and gas exploration and development in the
study area. It will be important to be clear about its role
before the start of the SEA process. SEA experiences in
the United Kingdom and Norway may offer more
insights here than the east coast experience as there are
more examples of follow-up development decisions in
areas subject to SEAs.
The fourth principle relates to the legal context within
which SEAs are carried out. They are not required by
the legislation which establishes either of the two
boards. The purpose, terms of reference and scope of
the process is not set out in laws, regulations or policy
guidance. There is no opportunity for appeal where SEA
principles or prescribed requirements seem not to have
been satisfied, and there are no procedures for monitoring, reviewing, iterative learning and identification
of needs for corrective action and implementation. The
responsibilities of the board, governments, industry
and other stakeholders are also not clearly defined
through legal or policy documents. In short, both
boards have proactively made a decision to conduct
SEAs, but these decisions have not yet been supported
by legislative change, regulations or even formal policy
guidance. Two things have happened to provide some
legal context: the SEAs have been brought under the
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federal cabinet directive on SEA;74 and SEA reports in
Newfoundland have started to make a link to the legislative mandate of the board by pointing out the role of
the board in ensuring oil and gas activities are carried
out in an environmentally responsible manner.75
In theory, the lack of legal context should make the
process very flexible, which brings us to the fifth principle. The benefit of this flexibility is that there is room
for learning by doing before the process is enshrined in
law. In practice, however, the adjustments to the processes in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland-Labrador
have been modest to date. The only discernible trend is
that SEAs executed in Newfoundland-Labrador have
made more of an effort to engage interested parties and
the general public.76 Ideally, the context for an SEA
process for the Beaufort Sea would be enshrined in
appropriate legislation, regulations and policies. At an
experimental stage, a clear policy statement can at
times be an adequate substitute so long as there is a
clear political commitment to the process, and provided
that the policy is enshrined in law as it moves on from
its experimental beginnings.
The sixth principle relates to public engagement and
transparency. Public participation has generally been
low in SEAs carried out by the C-NSOPB. The SEA
process has focused on engaging a few organizations
proactively. Key stakeholders and broader interested
public interest are invited to comment on the scoping
document and the final SEA report, but not enough
proactive steps are taken to encourage their direct participation in the process.77 Access to information has
been limited to draft and final reports and to submissions from other participants. Opportunities to submit
views were in many cases limited to written submissions with short timelines. No resources were made
available to those potentially affected to understand the
issues and participate, but there are preliminary signs
that opportunities for increased input have been
matched with cultural preferences.78 Public engagement is one of the most critical areas to build on when
looking at the experience on the east coast. More time
and resources will have to be made available, but
careful consideration also needs to be given to other
factors, such as the credibility of the process and clear
understanding of its role in decision making on offshore
oil and gas activity in the Beaufort Sea.
The seventh principle refers to the motivation of participants to learn from the SEA process and use it as a
74
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Ibid.
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Among the factors that influence public participation are awareness, adequate time and resources, easy access to information,
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basis for decision making. The SEAs carried out by the
boards have so far been about information gathering,
without any clear recommendations in the SEA or
direct decisions based on it.79 As a result, it is difficult to
comment on whether there are effective incentives in
place, or whether participants are motivated to learn
from the results of the process. Similarly, without clear
recommendations on what should happen as a result of
the SEAs, it is difficult to track performance. This issue
requires careful consideration in the design of an SEA
process for the Beaufort Sea, and the east coast experience offers little guidance in this regard.
The eighth principle relates to follow-up. Given the lack
of recommendations and decisions, it is not surprising
that there are no requirements for follow-up and monitoring of the implementation of the SEA as there are no
clear decisions or recommendations to implement. The
decision making takes place at the exploration project
level. Neither of the two boards has used SEAs to make
broad policy decisions. Both boards have made an
informal commitment to update SEAs if there is any
activity in the area more than five years after the initial
SEA. Any SEA process for the Beaufort Sea will have to
give careful consideration to the allocation of responsibility to ensure effective monitoring and follow-up,
including full transparency and effective response as
problems are identified. The experience on the east
coast offers no guidance on this issue.
The ninth principle refers to the political commitment
to implement an effective SEA process and to utilize its
results. Given the somewhat tentative nature of the SEA
process on the east coast to date, and limited time and
resources allocated to them, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that there is no significant political commitment to the process. It appears to be a process held
together by staff at the boards, mainly because it takes
limited resources and time to complete, it simplifies
project-specific EAs, and it does little to constrain decision makers. It is clear from the east coast experience
that political commitment is critical for the effectiveness of any SEA. The SEA process for the Beaufort Sea
therefore cannot be designed and implemented in isolation from the effort to gain political commitment. On
the one hand, there is no point in gaining political commitment for an SEA process that is ineffective, inefficient or unfair. On the other hand, there is no point in
designing an effective, efficient and fair process in line
with the first eight principles if there is no political
commitment to follow through. A big part of this will be
a shared understanding of the value of an effective SEA
process in improving the quality and efficiency of future
decisions regarding offshore oil and gas exploration
and development in the region.
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Of course, the boards would be expected to consider the information in deciding whether or not to issue exploration licences.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS:
APPLICATION OF SEAs TO
THE BEAUFORT SEA
This section offers some concluding thoughts on why
and how to integrate an SEA process into decisions
about oil and gas exploration in offshore areas in Northern Canada including the Beaufort Sea.80 We have
argued, consistent with the federal cabinet directive,
the Arctic Council guidelines, the Kiev Protocol and the
current practice of the C-NSOPB and C-NLOPB, that
governments in the Arctic should integrate SEAs into
the oil and gas exploration and rights issuance procedures in advance of issuing a call for nominations. A
well-designed SEA is the most effective and efficient
tool available to ensure an appropriate policy context
for development, the proper consideration of alternatives and to provide the necessary basis for cumulative
effects assessments at the project level. SEAs can also
be critical tools in engaging those potentially affected by
development to work toward a common vision. Ultimately, it is important that governments take decisions
as to whether to grant oil and gas rights in a particular
area rather than simply following industry’s lead. Governments need to make those decisions on an informed
basis in the long-term best interest of society.
The current legislation in Canada is flexible enough to
allow the Minister to require that an SEA be conducted.
We propose that the SEA be conducted before a call for
nominations and a call for bids. This proposed timing
addresses the first principle to the effect that the SEA
should be applied early and proactively. The Minister
might also retain the discretion to conduct additional
SEAs outside the rights issuance process to address scientific or spec seismic operations. We envisage that this
would be a rare situation, but in some cases seismic
operations may pose strategic questions as well as the
project-specific questions that would be addressed
through a CEAA screening or other review.
There are several possible ways in which to address
principles 2–5, including amendments to the CPRA,
and possibly to regulations, but neither approach is
necessary. Instead, just as the offshore boards have
developed guidance notes and similar documents,
including one relating to declarations of significant discovery, we think that it should be possible to follow a
similar approach here and develop a guidance document for ‘exploration SEAs’. This document would
address a number of matters including the scope of the
SEA (incorporating ecological, biophysical and socioeconomic issues) and the questions that the SEA should
address, including identification of information deficiencies and the linkages with other tiers of assessment.
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The scheme described here should apply to all lands covered by
the CPRA, but the primary focus of this article is the Beaufort Sea.

USING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS

The document would be sufficiently open-ended to
provide the flexibility to tailor it to the particular circumstances of the case.
As noted in the previous section, as parties obtain
experience with SEAs, it might be appropriate to
provide a more formal legal foundation for the process
in oil and gas dispositions. We anticipate that the Minister would have to take the lead in developing this
document (as the responsible party under the CPRA),
but in doing so the Minister would need to draw on the
expertise of others (including the NEB and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency), and closely
consult with the relevant institutions established by
the land claim agreements. These institutions would
include relevant bodies established by the Inuvialuit
Final Agreement and Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. Including these institutions at the outset would
help to establish the relevant linkages between the SEA
and other tiers of assessment including not only
project-specific environmental assessments, but also
land use planning procedures.
Such a guidance document for exploration SEAs would
also need to identify the entity that should be responsible for its conduct. We have noted that there are some
problems associated with having a body (like the offshore boards) with the responsibility for regulating oil
and gas exploration also assume responsibility for the
SEA. In the Beaufort Sea, the possible lead agencies
would include the Minister, the NEB or a relevant entity
established by a land claim agreement. The selection of
an entity other than the Minister or Department would
help establish the credibility and integrity of the
process. It will also be important to identify those
parties who will use the resulting SEAs and for what
purpose. These might include the following:
• The Minister may use the SEA to decide whether to
issue a call for nominations and to inform the configuration of bidding blocks and the minimum
terms and conditions to be included in the bidding
documents.
• The NEB may use the SEA in issuing authorizations
under COGOA and establishing appropriate terms
and conditions for those authorizations.
• Institutions established by land claim agreements,
including those bodies with responsibilities for land
use planning and screening and project assessment,
may also use the SEA report in discharging their
responsibilities under the terms of the land claim
agreement and any implementing legislation.
These issues are clearly related to, and overlap with, the
third principle that deals with tiers of assessments.
The sixth principle addresses the importance of transparency and public involvement in the process. Our
assessment of the experience with the offshore boards
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suggests that this has been a weak area in the practice of
the boards and that the party responsible for the SEA
will need to be proactive. It is typically more difficult to
engage the public in a strategic assessment than in a
project-specific assessment. This issue also needs to
be covered in the proposed guidance document. The
timing issues might be resolved by decoupling the SEA
from the timelines established by the call for bids
process but it will be important that the guidance document address the funding for informed community
involvement.

The current procedure of the east coast boards is ad hoc
in the sense that it is not enshrined in legislation or
regulations, which leads directly to some of the shortcomings that we have identified. We think that a key
step in addressing many of these issues lies in the development of an appropriate guidance document. Such a
document would have to be developed collaboratively
with the relevant institutions of the land claim agreement if it were to have any credibility and legitimacy
and to allow SEAs to contribute to appropriate tiered
decision making.

Principles 7–9 deal with incentives, follow-up and
political commitment. The principal incentive for
engaging in high quality SEAs might be stated in several
ways. First, adoption of SEAs as standard practice is
consistent with the recommendations of the Arctic
Council,81 of which Canada is a member. It is also consistent with the requirements of the federal cabinet
directive. Indeed, it is not clear to us how the Minister
has managed to avoid conducting SEAs.82 Second, the
SEA procedure is consistent with the Crown’s obligations under the terms of relevant land claim agreements
as well as any freestanding constitutional obligation to
consult (and accommodate) aboriginal peoples in relation to proposed decisions that may affect their rights
and interests.83 Establishing clear procedures for when
and how SEAs will be implemented will provide a
degree of legal certainty for all parties, including government and industry, and help meet the Crown’s constitutional obligations.

In conclusion, we reiterate that the SEA process proposed here would draw on much of the valuable work
that has been ongoing in the Beaufort Sea over a
number of years under the auspices of the Beaufort Sea
Strategic Regional Plan of Action, a joint federalInuvialuit-industry oil and gas planning process, and
the proposed Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment, which will be launched in 2012 for a five-year
term. This project should contribute to the quality of
the SEAs anticipated by this article since it will, inter
alia, identify and address data gaps and generate
regional scale scientific and socioeconomic information
that can be fed in to the SEA, but it does not replace the
need for the SEA.

Requirements for follow-up might also be prescribed in
the proposed exploration SEA guidance document. The
guidance will need to identify the parties responsible
for drawing up the list of those whose decisions will be
informed by the SEA. The principal evidence of political
commitment to the process will be the development of
the guidance document (or amendments to the CPRA
or new regulations) as well as the actual use of the
resulting SEAs in decision making. Other evidence will
be a commitment to involve local communities in the
process. This will demonstrate that SEAs are not being
conducted simply to tick a box, but to inform subsequent decision making.84
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See Arctic Council, n. 8 above.
It is important to emphasize that we are not suggesting that compliance with the federal cabinet directive is adequate since we base
our evaluation of the adequacy of an SEA process on the nine
principles distilled from the literature, rather than the formal requirements of the directive.
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Beckman, n. 35 above.
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We might borrow here the phrase ‘demonstrably integrated’, which
comes from some of the aboriginal consultation cases. See Halfway
River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) (1999),
BCCA 470; West Moberly First Nations v. British Columbia (2011),
BCCA 247. Using this as a test it will be up to government through
policy statements, press releases and specific decisions to demonstrate how it is taking into account and using the results of the SEA.
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More broadly, legislated SEAs along the lines outlined
here should become a standard part of any regulatory
regime for offshore oil and gas exploration in the
broader Arctic region and beyond. The experience on
the east coast shows the potential value, but also the
limitations of an ad hoc process with a limited mandate
and resources. A well-implemented SEA process at
the early stages would significantly enhance decision
making in the offshore oil and gas sector.
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